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In this paper we demonstrate a striking regularity in the way people place limit orders in finan-
cial markets, using a data set consisting of roughly seven million orders from the London Stock
Exchange. We define the relative limit price as the difference between the limit price and the best
price available. Merging the data from 50 stocks, we demonstrate that for both buy and sell orders,
the unconditional cumulative distribution of relative limit prices decays roughly as a power law with
exponent approximately −1.5. This behavior spans more than two decades, ranging from a few ticks
to about 2000 ticks. Time series of relative limit prices show interesting temporal structure, char-
acterized by an autocorrelation function that asymptotically decays as C(τ ) ∼ τ−0.4. Furthermore,
relative limit price levels are positively correlated with and are led by price volatility. This feedback
may potentially contribute to clustered volatility.
In this paper we demonstrate a new behavioral regular-
ity of financial markets. Most modern financial markets
use a continuous double auction mechanism, based on
limit orders, which specify both a quantity and a limit
price (the worst acceptable price). We study the relative
limit price δ(t), the limit price in relation to the current
best price. For buy orders δ(t) = b(t) − p(t), where p is
the limit price, b is the best bid (highest buy limit price),
and t is the time when the order is placed. For sell or-
ders δ(t) = p(t) − a(t), where a is the best ask (lowest
sell limit price)[1].
The limit order trading mechanism works as follows:
As each new limit order arrives, it is matched against
the queue of pre-existing limit orders, called the limit or-
der book, to determine whether or not it results in any
immediate transactions. At any given time there is a best
buy price b(t), and a best ask price a(t). A sell order that
crosses b(t), or a buy order that crosses a(t), results in
at least one transaction. The matching for transactions
is performed based on price and order of arrival. Thus
matching begins with the order of the opposite sign that
has the best price and arrived first, then proceeds to the
order (if any) with the same price that arrived second,
and so on, repeating for the next best price, etc. The
matching process continues until the arriving order has
either been entirely transacted, or until there are no or-
ders of the opposite sign with prices that satisfy the ar-
riving order’s limit price. Anything that is left over is
stored in the limit order book.
Choosing a relative limit price is a strategic decision
that involves a tradeoff between patience and profit.
Consider, for example, a sell order; the story for buy
orders is the same, interchanging “high” and “low”. An
impatient seller will submit a limit order with a limit
price well below b(t), which will typically immediately
result in a transaction. A seller of intermediate patience
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will submit an order with p(t) a little greater than b(t);
this will not result in an immediate transaction, but will
have high priority as new buy orders arrive. A very pa-
tient seller will submit an order with p(t) much greater
than b(t). This order is unlikely to be executed soon, but
it will trade at a good price if it does. A higher price
is clearly desirable, but it comes at the cost of lower-
ing the probability of trading – the higher the price, the
lower the probability there will be a trade. The choice
of limit price is a complex decision that depends on the
goals of each agent. There are many factors that could
affect the choice of limit price, such as the time horizon
of the trading strategy. A priori it is not obvious that
the unconditional distribution of limit prices should have
any particular simple functional form.
We investigate the relative limit price δ(t) for stocks
traded on the London Stock Exchange between August
1, 1998 and April 31, 2000. This data set contains many
errors; we chose the names we analyse here from the sev-
eral hundred that are traded on the exchange based on
the ease of cleaning the data, trying to keep a reasonable
balance between high and low volume stocks [2]. This
left 50 different names, with a total of roughly seven mil-
lion limit orders. We discard orders with negative values
of δ, i.e., we consider only orders that are placed outside
the spread [3]. Figure (1) shows examples of the cumula-
tive distribution for stocks with the largest and smallest
number of limit orders. Each order is given the same
weighting, regardless of the number of shares, and the
distribution for each stock is normalized so that it sums
to one. There is considerable variation in the sample dis-
tribution from stock to stock, but these plots nonetheless
suggest that power law behavior for large δ is a reasonable
hypothesis. This is somewhat clearer for the stocks with
high order arrival rates. The low volume stocks show
larger fluctuations, presumably because of their smaller
sample sizes. Although there is a large number of events
in each of these distributions, as we will show later, the
samples are highly correlated, so that the effective num-
ber of independent samples is not nearly as large as it
seems.
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FIG. 1: (a) Cumulative distribution functions P (δ) =
Prob{x ≥ δ} of relative limit price δ for both buy and sell
orders for the 15 stocks with the largest number of limit or-
ders during the period of the sample (those that have between
150,000 and 400,000 orders in the sample.) (b) Same for 15
stocks with the lowest number of limit orders, in the range
2,000 to 100,000. [4]
To reduce the sampling errors we merge the data for
all stocks, and estimate the sample distribution for the
merged set using the method of ranks, as shown in figure
(2). We fit the resulting distribution to the functional
form
P (δ) =
A
(x0 + δ)β
, (1)
A is set by the normalization, and is a simple function of
x0 and β. Fitting this to the entire sample (both buys
and sells) gives x0 = 7.01± 0.05, and β = 1.491± 0.001.
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FIG. 2: An estimate of the cumulative probability distribu-
tion based on a merged data set, containing the relative limit
order sizes δ(t) for all 50 stocks across the entire sample. The
solid curve is a non-linear least squares fit to the logarithmic
form of equation (1).
Buys and sells gave similar values for the exponent, i.e.
β = 1.49 in both cases. Since these error bars based on
goodness of fit are certainly overly optimistic, we also
tested the stability of the results by fitting buys and sells
separately on the first and last half of the sample, which
gave values in the range 1.47 < β < 1.52. Furthermore,
we checked whether there are significant differences in the
estimated parameters for stocks with high vs. low order
arrival rates. The results ranged from β = 1.5 for high to
β = 1.7 for low arrival rates, but for the low arrival rate
group we do not have high confidence in the estimate.
As one can see from the figure, the fit is reasonably
good. The power law is a good approximation across
more than two decades, for relative limit prices ranging
from about 10 − 2000 ticks. For British stocks ticks are
measured either in pence, half pence, or quarter pence; in
the former case, 2000 ticks corresponds to about twenty
pounds. Given the low probability of execution for or-
ders with such high relative limit prices this is quite sur-
prising. (For Vodafone, for example, the highest relative
limit price that eventually resulted in a transaction was
240 ticks). The value of the exponent β ≈ 1.5 implies
that the mean of the distribution exists, but its variance
is formally infinite. Note that because normalized power
law distributions are scale free, the asymptotic behavior
does not depend on units, e.g. ticks vs. pounds. There
appears to be a break in the power law at about 2000
ticks, with sell orders deviating above and buy orders
deviating below. A break at roughly this point is ex-
pected for buy orders due to the fact that p = 0 places
a lower bound on the limit price. For a stock trading at
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FIG. 3: (a) Time series of randomly shuffled values of δ(t)
for stock Barclays Bank. (b) True time series δ(t). (c) The
absolute value of the change in the best price between each
event in the δ(t) series.
10 pounds, for example, with a ticksize of a half pence,
2000 ticks is the lowest possible relative limit price for
a buy order. The reason for a corresponding break for
sell orders is not so obvious, but in view of the extreme
low probability of execution, is not surprising. It should
also be kept in mind that the number of events in the
extreme tail is very low, so this could also be a statistical
fluctuation.
The time series of relative limit prices also has inter-
esting temporal structure. This is apparent to the eye,
as seen in figure (3b), which shows the average relative
limit price δ¯ in intervals of approximately 60 events for
Barclays Bank. For reference, in figure (3a) we show
the same series with the order of the events random-
ized. Comparing the two suggests that the large and
small events are more clustered in the real series than in
the shuffled series.
This temporal structure appears to be described by a
slowly decaying autocorrelation function, as shown in fig-
ure (4). Since the second moment of the unconditional
distribution does not exist there are potential problems
in computing the autocorrelation function. The standard
deviations in the denominator formally do not exist, and
the terms in the numerator can be slow to converge. To
cope with this we have imposed a cutoff at 1000 ticks, av-
eraged across all 50 stocks in our sample, and smoothed
the autocorrelation function for large lags (where the sta-
tistical significance drops). The resulting average auto-
correlation function decays asymptotically as a power law
of the form C(τ) ∼ τ−γ , with γ ≈ 0.4, indicating that
relative limit price placement is quite persistent with no
characteristic time scale. In the figure we have computed
the autocorrelation function in tick time, i.e. the lags cor-
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FIG. 4: The autocorrelation of the time series of relative limit
prices δ, averaged across all 50 stocks in the sample, and
smoothed across different lags. This is computed in tick time,
i.e., the x-axis indicates the number of events, rather than a
fixed time.
respond to the event order. This means that low volume
stocks have longer real time intervals than high volume
stocks. We have also obtained a similar result using real
time, by computing the mean limit price δ¯ in thirteen
minute intervals (merging daily boundaries). In this case
the behavior is not quite as regular but is still qualita-
tively similar. We still see a slowly decaying power law
tail, though with a somewhat lower exponent (roughly
0.3). The autocorrelations are quite significant even for
lags of 1000, corresponding to about 8 days. Roughly
the same behavior is seen for buy and sell orders, and for
the first ten months and the last ten months of the sam-
ple. We computed error bars for this result by randomly
shuffling the timeseries 100 times, and computing the 2.5
and 97.5 percent quantiles of the sample autocorrelation
for each lag. This gives error bars at roughly ±10−3.
One consequence of such a slowly decaying autocorre-
lation is the slow convergence of sample distributions to
their limiting distribution. If we generate artificial IID
data with equation (1) as its unconditional distribution,
the sample distributions converge very quickly with only
a few thousand points. In contrast for the real data, even
for a stock with 200,000 points the sample distributions
display large fluctuations. When we examine subsamples
of the real data, the correlations in the deviations across
subsamples are obvious and persist for long periods in
time, even when there is no overlap in the subsamples.
We believe that the slow convergence of the sample dis-
tributions is mainly due to the long range temporal de-
pendence in the data.
To get some insight into the possible cause of the tem-
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FIG. 5: The cross autocorrelation of the time series of relative
limit prices δ(t) and volatilities v(t − τ ), averaged across all
50 stocks in the sample.
poral correlations, we compare the time series of relative
limit prices to the corresponding price volatility. The
price volatility is measured as v(t) = |log(b(t)/b(t− 1))|,
where b(t) is the best bid for buy orders or the best ask
for sell limit orders. We show a typical volatility series in
figure (3c). One can see by eye that epochs of high limit
price tend to coincide with epochs of high volatility.
To help understand the possible relation between
volatility and relative limit price we calculate their cross-
autocorrelation. This is defined as
XCF (τ) =
〈v(t − τ)δ(t)〉 − 〈v(t)〉〈δ(t)〉
σvσδ
, (2)
where 〈·〉 denotes a sample average, and σ denotes the
standard deviation. We first create a series of the average
relative limit price and average volatility over 10 minute
intervals. We then compute the cross-autocorrelation
function and average over all stocks. The result is shown
in figure (5).
We test the statistical significance of this result by test-
ing against the null hypothesis that the volatility and
relative limit price are uncorrelated. To do this we have
to cope with the problem that the individual series are
highly autocorrelated, as demonstrated in figure (4), and
the 50 series for each stock also tend to be correlated to
each other. To solve these problems, we construct sam-
ples of the null hypothesis using a technique introduced in
reference [5]. We compute the discrete Fourier transform
of the relative limit price time series. We then randomly
permute the phases of the series, and perform the in-
verse Fourier transform. This creates a realization of the
null hypothesis, drawn from a distribution with the same
unconditional distribution and the same autocorrelation
function. Because we use the same random permutation
of phases for each of the 50 series, we also preserve their
correlation to each other. We then compute the cross
autocorrelation function between each of the 50 surro-
gate limit price series and its corresponding true volatil-
ity series, and then average the results. We then repeat
this experiment 300 times, which gives us a distribution
of realizations of averaged sample cross-autocorrelation
functions under the null hypothesis. This procedure is
more appropriate in this case than the standard moving
block bootstrap, which requires choice of a timescale and
will not work for a series such as this that does not have
a characteristic timescale. The 2.5% and 97.5% quantile
error bars at each lag are denoted by the two solid lines
near zero in figure (5).
From this figure it is clear that there is indeed a strong
contemporaneous correlation between volatility and rel-
ative limit price, and that the result is highly signifi-
cant. Furthermore, there is some asymmetry in the cross-
autocorrelation function; the peak occurs at a lag of one
rather than zero, and there is more mass on the right
than on the left. This suggests that there is some ten-
dency for volatility to lead the relative limit price. This
implies one of three things: (1) Volatility and limit price
have a common cause, but this cause is for some reason
felt later for the relative limit price; (2) the agents placing
orders key off of volatility and correctly anticipate it; or,
more plausibly, (3) volatility at least partially causes the
relative limit price. Note that this suggests an interesting
feedback loop: Holding other aspects of the order place-
ment process constant, an increase in the average relative
limit price will lower the depth in the limit order book at
any particular price level, and therefore increase volatil-
ity. Since such a feedback loop is unstable, there are
presumably nonlinear feedbacks of the opposite sign that
eventually damp it. Nonetheless, such a feedback loop
may potentially contribute to creating clustered volatil-
ity.
One of the most surprising aspects of the power law
behavior of relative limit price is that traders place their
orders so far away from the current price. As is evident in
figure (2), orders occur with relative limit prices as large
as 10,000 ticks (or 25 pounds for a stock with ticks in
quarter pence). While we have taken some precautions to
screen for errors, such as plotting the data and looking for
unreasonable events, despite our best efforts, it is likely
that there are still data errors remaining in this series.
There appears to be a break in the merged unconditional
distribution at about 2000 ticks; if this is statistically
significant, it suggests that the very largest events may
follow a different distribution than the rest of the sample,
and might be dominated by data errors. Nonetheless,
since we know that most of the smaller events are real,
and since we see no break in the behavior until roughly
δ ≈ 2000, errors are highly unlikely to be the cause of
the power law behavior seen for δ < 2000.
The conundrum of very large limit orders is com-
pounded by consideration of the average waiting time
for execution as a function of relative limit price. We
5intend to investigate the dependence of the waiting time
on the limit price in the future, but since this requires
tracking each limit order, the data analysis is more dif-
ficult. We have checked this for one stock, Vodafone,
in which the largest relative limit price that resulted in
an eventual trade was δ = 240 ticks. Assuming other
stocks behave similarly, this suggests that either traders
are strongly over-optimistic about the probability of exe-
cution, or that the orders with large relative limit prices
are placed for other reasons.
Since obtaining our results we have seen a recent
preprint by Bouchaud et al. [6] analyzing three stocks
on the Paris Bourse over a period of a month. They also
obtain a power law for P (δ), but they observe an expo-
nent β ≈ 0.6, in contrast to our value β ≈ 1.5. We do
not understand why there should be such a discrepancy
in results. While they analyze only three stock-months
of data, whereas we have analyzed roughly 1050 stock-
months, their order arrival rates are roughly 20 times
higher than ours, and their sample distributions appear
to follow the power law scaling fairly well.
One possible explanation is the long-range correlation.
Assuming the Paris data show the same behavior we have
observed, the decay in the autocorrelation is so slow that
there may not be good convergence in a month, even with
a large number of samples. The sample exponent βˆ based
on one month samples may vary with time, even if the
sample distributions appear to be well-converged. It is
of course also possible that the French behave differently
than the British, and that for some reason the French
prefer to place orders much further from the midpoint.
Our original motivation for this work was to model
price formation in the limit order book, as part of the re-
search program for understanding the volatility and liq-
uidity of markets outlined in reference [7]. P (δ) is im-
portant for price formation, since where limit orders are
placed affects the depth of the limit order book and hence
the diffusion rate of prices. The power law behavior ob-
served here has important consequences for volatility and
liquidity that will be described in a future paper.
Our results here are interesting for their own sake in
terms of human psychology. They show how a striking
regularity can emerge when human beings are confronted
with a complicated decision problem. Why should the
distribution of relative limit prices be be a power law,
and why should it decay with this particular exponent?
Our results suggest that the volatility leads the relative
limit price, indicating that traders probably use volatility
as a signal when placing orders. This supports the obvi-
ous hypothesis that traders are reasonably aware of the
volatility distribution when placing orders, an effect that
may contribute to the phenomenon of clustered volatility.
Plerou et al. have observed a power law for the uncondi-
tional distribution of price fluctuations [8]. It seems that
the power law for price fluctuations should be related
to that of relative limit prices, but the precise nature
and the cause of this relationship is not clear. The ex-
ponent for price fluctuations of individual companies re-
ported by Plerou et al. is roughly 3, but the exponent we
have measured here is roughly 1.5. Why these particular
exponents? Makoto Nirei has suggested that if traders
have power law utility functions, under the assumption
that they optimize this utility, it is possible to derive an
expression for β in terms of the exponent of price fluc-
tuations and the coefficient of risk aversion. However,
this explanation is not fully satisfying, and more work
is needed [9]. At this point the underlying cause of the
power law behavior of relative limit prices remains a mys-
tery.
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